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Abstract 
This paper is about the alignment of technology and modes of organization in 
infrastructures in the context of their reform. Since infrastructures are characterized by 
strong technical complementarities, we explore the resulting ‘critical technical functions’ 
that need to be performed in order to guarantee the expected technical performance of the 
system. We characterize ‘critical transactions’ as essential to provide adequate support to 
these functions. We distinguish various modes of organization that can effectively 
coordinate these critical transactions. We argue that the features of these transactions 
determine the alignment between organization and technology and should be taken 
explicitly into account when reforming infrastructures.   
 
 
Key words: Transaction costs, technology, institutional change, reforms of infrastructures
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I. Introduction 
Reforming infrastructures has been high on the agenda of economists and policy 
makers over the last three decades. Introducing ‘more market’ has been at the core of these 
reforms, with the underlying rationale that this is the adequate way to increase efficiency, to 
stimulate suppliers to serve consumers’ needs, and to innovate in products and processes. In 
addition changes in the allocation of property rights, with the reintroduction of private 
interests in infrastructures, have often been considered inevitable in order to finance the 
huge investment needs in sectors like telecom, energy, rail transport, and water. For 
example, it has been estimated that investments of a magnitude of over $ 100 billion (in 
2003 US dollars) within a decade would be required to halve the percentage of population 
without access to drinking water and basic sanitation.1 
 
Although changes in property rights and the related decision rights may take many 
different directions, almost all restructuring of very diverse infrastructures seems to follow 
a similar recipe. Infrastructure firms that have historically developed as vertically integrated 
monopolies are separated into different entities in order to allow for competition. 
Monopolistic activities (exploitation of network related services) are unbundled from 
activities for which it is assumed that competition can be introduced (production and supply 
of different services). The monopolistic segment needs to be closely regulated in order to 
safeguard a level playing field. For this purpose independent regulatory agencies are 
established that typically supervise the access and pricing of the network services. 
Simultaneously, particularly with respect to the competitive segment, there is a switch from 
a command-and-control approach to a contractual one. 
                                                 
1
 UN Millennium Project (2005). 
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 Following this pattern, liberalization seems essentially a matter of institutional 
change, i.e. the design of well functioning markets in order to provide sufficient incentives 
to serve the above mentioned objectives. Technology is not considered an important factor 
enabling or frustrating this process of change. Most reforms of infrastructures assume that 
technology will change autonomously and adapt quite smoothly, thanks to the incentives 
provided by the new rules of the game.  
 
In this paper, we argue that infrastructures are complex technical systems with a 
strong degree of complementarity that is enabled through network relationships. 
Accordingly, all major elements technically interact in a specific manner with each other, 
which makes it possible to produce certain services like the provision of energy, 
telecommunication, clean drinking water, or rail transport. These complex technical 
systems have very peculiar economic features including path dependence, lock-in effects, 
multiple and possibly inefficient equilibria.2 Hence, it might be expected that the 
technological status of various infrastructures influences the opportunities for restructuring 
and contributes to shape the resulting performance. Building upon the literature on co-
evolution,3 with a view at how transactions are organized or can be organized in that 
context, we aim to further elaborate on the mutual relations between institutions and 
technology in infrastructures. Focusing mostly on one aspect of performance, the technical 
one, we show that the technical functioning of infrastructures needs to be supported by 
appropriate modes of organization. Insufficient or failing institutional support results in 
inferior technical performance contributing to unreliable services or in extreme cases even 
                                                 
2
 David (1985), Arthur (1988), Economides (1996).  
3
 See, for instance, Nelson (1994), Dosi (1982), Von Tunzelmann (2003), Perez (2002), Saviotti (1996),  
Murmann (2003).  
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to system outages. There is empirical evidence that the technical functioning of at least 
some infrastructures did not meet expectations after reforms, particularly when reforms 
combined unbundling and changes in the allocation of both property rights and decision 
rights. Refer for instance to the various blackouts in electricity systems4, or some train 
accidents that followed reform of the British rail sector.5 We take such anecdotal evidence 
only as an incentive to better understand the role of technology in the process of regulatory 
reforms in infrastructures. What we intend to do is to identify critical technical functions 
and to show how they impose properties on transactions that should be reflected in the 
adequate alignment of the technical functions with the modes of organization.  Hence this 
article takes a theoretical perspective and does not intend to further explore the incidence of 
specific technical malfunction in various infrastructures.  
 
   The core of our argument is that the technical complementarity between the various 
elements of infrastructure systems most of the time imposes a technical need for 
coordination with respect to functions like capacity management, system management, 
interconnection, and interoperability.6 These technical functions can be considered as 
critical for safeguarding the technical performance of infrastructures. In the railway sector, 
                                                 
4
 For historical trends of large blackouts in North America between 1984 and 2006 see Hines, Apt and 
Talukdar (2009). We argue in this paper that in times of technical distress the institutional support of critical 
technical functions is essential to safeguard the functioning of the infrastructure system.   
5
 Gourvish (2008) provides a comprehensive historical analysis of the reform of British railways between 
1997 and 2005. The Hatfield crash on October 17th, 2000 (four people were killed and 70 injured), was a 
watershed in the reform of this sector from privatization and liberalization back to more stringent 
governmental monitoring and control. We interpret this as a possible indication that certain critical technical 
functions are not supported by sufficiently effective modes of organization. 
6
 Finger, Groenewegen and Künneke (2005), p.240 – 241.  
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for instance, traffic control is very crucial to maintain the technical reliability of the system. 
A failure of this aspect of capacity management can cause accidents and threaten the 
technical integrity of the infrastructure. Similar examples are the monitoring of the quality 
of drinking water (poor quality might cause severe health problems) and load balancing in 
the electricity sector (blackouts occur if the system is imbalanced).7 Taking this technical 
criticality as point of departure, the question arises whether we can identify supporting 
‘critical transactions’ that are essential for the functioning of infrastructures. In other 
words: if critical transactions are not well coordinated, some technological critical functions 
of the systems are not satisfied so that the system severely fails to deliver the expected 
services. We are interested in modes of organization that guarantee the coordination of 
critical transactions related to critical technical functions of liberalized infrastructures.  
 
In order to explore this issue, we are building on different strands of literature. New 
Institutional Economics provides an important source of inspiration with its emphasis on 
the alignment of modes of organization with transactions at stake (Williamson, 1996) as 
well as with the identification of the key role played by institutional factors in technological 
changes (North, 1990 chap.9) and in the reform of infrastructures (Joskow, 1997). 
However, as acknowledged repeatedly by Williamson, the transaction cost perspective that 
provides foundations to this approach has not really integrated the technological dimension.  
 
Our paper intends to make a step in this direction. We perceive infrastructures as 
complex socio-technical systems in which technological, economic, political, and social 
features strongly interact with each other (Perez, 2002, Van de Poel, 2003, Kroes et al., 
                                                 
7
 Load balancing refers to the technical balancing of production and consumption in electricity networks that 
needs to be guaranteed at every moment of time.  
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2006, Geels and Schot, 2007). We focus on problems associated to the technical control of 
these systems (Nightingale et al., 2003), which we perceive as critical technical functions. 
Traditionally this is the field of control engineering that deploys very sophisticated 
technical approaches to secure the proper technical functioning of complex technical 
systems (Dutton et al., 1997). We are interested in relating technical characteristics of these 
control mechanisms to different modes of organization. Hence we focus on issues 
associated with the effectiveness of transactions that govern these technical control 
mechanisms.  
 
 The article is structured as follows. Section II specifies the notion of technical 
criticality in infrastructures. Critical technical functions are determined from a control 
engineering perspective, which is an important way to aligning the actual to the desired 
technical performance. Section III defines critical transactions, which are transactions 
providing essential support to the critical control mechanisms. Section IV identifies modes 
of organization to secure these critical transactions. Differences in critical transactions and 
modes of governance across infrastructures and over time are elaborated in Section V. The 
main findings are summarized in Section VI. 
 
II. TECHNICAL CRITICALITY IN INFRASTRUCTURES 
 A core argument that we develop in this paper is that technology imposes critical 
functions and that the benign neglect of this issue in reforms of infrastructures is reflected 
in misalignments of modes of organization with the requirements of the critical technical 
functions. We put special emphasis on control-related problems. 
 
II.1 Criticality: a multifaceted concept 
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The notion of criticality is fuzzy and hence difficult to define and delineate. Often 
the term ‘critical’ is used to qualify things or circumstances considered significant or 
fundamental, whether the connotation is positive or negative. Refer for instance to 
expressions like ‘critical mass’, ‘critical information’, ‘critical rules and regulation’, 
‘critical services’ and ‘critical infrastructures’. This article does not elaborate on the 
problem which infrastructures are to be considered critical and for what reason.8 Rather, we 
take it as a given that there are infrastructures that are fundamental for the functioning of 
our societies (e.g., the provision of drinkable water). Therefore, in this paragraph we focus 
on identifying those aspects of the technical operation and management of any given 
infrastructure that are critical in order to meet expectations with respect to the technical 
functioning of these systems. In order to determine criticality in this context, we need to 
reflect on two aspects: 
- How to specify expectations with respect to the technical functioning of 
infrastructures? 
- How to identify those aspects of the technical operation and management of 
infrastructures to be considered as critical with these expectations in mind?  
 
 Expectations with respect to the technical functioning of infrastructures include 
reliability, safety, and security of supply. Technical reliability refers to the ability of the 
infrastructure system to produce certain services at the expected place within the expected 
period of time. For instance, electricity has to be available to all users connected to the 
network at all moments of time. Safety deals with the secure use of the services delivered 
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  A report to the US Congress (Moteff, Copeland and Fischer 2003) made such an exhaustive list of 
components that are ‘critical’ for the running of an economy, from agriculture to airline to the banking 
system. 
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through infrastructures, like for instance clean drinking water or secure means of rail 
transport.  Since infrastructures might cause significant external effects, non users need also 
to be protected against the possible consequences of the technical malfunctioning of these 
systems. The safety of nuclear power plants illustrates this point. Finally security of supply 
represents the ability of infrastructures to sustain their activities in the foreseeable future. In 
the energy sector for instance, primary energy sources need to be available for the 
production of electricity.  
 
 Referring to the second question, the criticality of the operation and management of 
infrastructures is very much determined by the strong degree of technical system 
complementarities. Since the components of infrastructures are in one way or another 
connected through a physical network, they cannot be operated independently from each 
other. Hence, criticality can occur in at least two different manners. First, there might be 
assets that are fundamental for the functioning of the system (Moteff et al., 2003). 
Examples of critical assets are traffic control of railroad systems, transmission lines in 
electricity, or pumping stations in the water sector. Failures of critical assets lead to serious 
interruptions not only in the infrastructures in question, but throughout society.9 Obviously, 
an empirical identification of these critical assets requires a very detailed analysis of 
different infrastructures, e.g., their specific geographical settings.10  Second, technical 
                                                 
9
 Moteff, Copeland and Fischer (2003) provide an overview for the case of the War Against Terror in the 
USA.  
10
 For instance in the USA, “the electric power infrastructure includes 92,000 electric generating units 
(including fossil fueled, nuclear, and hydroelectric units), 300,000 miles of transmission lines, and 150 control 
centers, regulating the flow of electricity. The nation’s water infrastructure includes 75,000 dams and 
reservoirs, thousands of miles of pipes and aqueducts, 168,000 public drinking water facilities, and 16,000 
publicly owned waste water treatment facilities”. Moteff, Copeland and Fischer (2003), p.8.  
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criticality can depend on specific functions that are essential to safeguard the technical 
performance of infrastructures, such as timetabling in the railroad sector or load balancing 
in electricity. Although these two interpretations of criticality have unambiguously 
complementarities, here we focus mostly on this second aspect, that is, the technical 
functions of criticality. In order to do that, we first proceed with a short overview of control 
issues in an engineering perspective. 
 
II.2: A control engineering perspective  
As already mentioned, one of the basic features of infrastructures is the high degree 
of technical complementarity between its different components. This requires coordination 
in order to safeguard the satisfactory functioning of the system. In order to facilitate this 
complementarity, control mechanisms need to be established that monitor important 
performance parameters. For instance, in railways slots need to be allocated in such a way 
as to avoid delays or, even worse, accidents. 
 
Control engineering is concerned with the planning and control of complex 
technical systems. Mathematical modelling is used to analyse the dynamic behaviour of 
infrastructures and to contribute to their reliable operation and management.11 An important 
objective of control engineering is to align the actual performance of a technical system 
with the desired performance. In electricity, the voltage level needs to be stable within a 
certain bandwidth. In the water sector, the physical network must meet requirements 
imposed by the laws of turbulence. On a very general level there are two possibilities to 
model these kinds of control problems, i.e. the so called open and closed control systems. 
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 See for instance Dutton, Thompson and Barraclough (1997) 
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Open control systems are based on the assumption that the relation between input12 
and system performance is sufficiently stable to satisfy expectations, while ensuring the 
technical functioning of the system. The operation of the system is predetermined and there 
is no feedback between the actual and the desired performance.13 In infrastructures, the use 
of public roads is an example. The availability of certain types of roads (i.e. the systems 
input) is assumed to sufficiently predict the desired performance (i.e. the accessibility of 
certain places in a certain time). Traditionally there is no feedback between the desired and 
the actual time of travel.14 The technical management and operation of these open control 
systems is not directly concerned with actual use and performance, but primarily deals with 
the proper provision of the required production factors (i.e. the input). This case is rather 
the exception than the rule in infrastructures. We therefore concentrate on the more 
complex case of closed control systems. 
 
Closed control systems are characterized by a feedback loop between the actual and 
desired performance and the ability to adjust system performance in case of intolerable 
differences between both. Examples of these closed loop control systems can be found in 
many infrastructures, as with the allocation of scarce network capacity in electricity, 
railroad or water infrastructures. Elements of such technical control systems are 
summarized in (Figure 1).  
                                                 
12
 In control engineering the term input refers to the production factors (for instance a power plant, primary 
energy sources, and labor) that are involved in a complex system.  
13
 The classical example of an open loop system is a washing machine. The predetermined programs are 
operated without actual feedback of the users whether they are satisfied with the result or not. 
14
 Recently more advanced dynamic systems of road traffic control have been developed in order to cope with 
the increasing problems of congestion. These can be considered as closed loop systems. 
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Figure 1. Elements in a technical control system 
Technical 
process
Meter:
Measuring 
actual 
performance 
Actuator:
Performing 
desired action
Compensator:
Signalling 
dfferences
Comparator:
Comparing 
actual and 
desired 
performance
External 
disturbances
Reference 
value
Feedback loop
 
 
The core element of this scheme is a technical process that is subject to external 
disturbances influencing its performance. In the electricity sector, for instance, the demand 
for power fluctuates even within very short time periods, because users switch their 
electrical appliances on and off in a not completely predictable way. Since there are no 
opportunities for storage, the power production needs to be adapted instantaneously in 
order to meet this changing demand and thus safeguard the technical reliability of the 
power system.  Figure 1 depicts various technical interventions necessary to accommodate 
a feedback between the actual and desired performance. Starting from the left to the right 
the technical elements of a closed system can be characterized as follows. The comparator 
compares the actual performance with the desired performance. The desired performance is 
assumed to be externally given as a set point or reference variable. The system 
performance is operationalized in terms of proxy variables that are measurable with a 
sufficient degree of accuracy. Important technical performance parameters of the electricity 
system include the voltage level (for instance 240 Volt) and the frequency (60 Hertz). 
Possible deviations are signalled to the compensator, which is a device that calculates the 
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appropriate action to be taken. A dropping frequency of alternate electric current can be 
compensated by increasing the spinning reserve of electricity generation. The actuator 
performs this desired action. Finally the technical system is adjusted as a reaction to the 
external disturbances. In the next control cycle, the actual performance is measured again, 
and a new feedback loop is initiated. 
  
Control engineering contributes to the stability and robustness of infrastructures.15 
After an external disturbance the system needs to return to a technical equilibrium position. 
The time to respond is an important feature for at least two reasons. First, the costs 
associated to the unsatisfactory functioning of the system need to be minimized. These 
include the costs of the actuation (i.e. correction) of the disturbance and the costs imposed 
to the system as a consequence of the malfunctioning. Obviously there is a trade-off 
between both. Second, certain technical processes imply a time span of control that cannot 
be exceeded without threatening the system integrity.16 With respect to operation and 
management, these processes typically require a short-term reaction. An extreme case is the 
load management between electricity production and consumption, which demands an 
almost instantaneous response of only micro- seconds. 
  
Technical control engineering is typically concerned with the short term balancing 
of the day-to-day operation of complex systems, usually under very rigid assumptions. The 
production process is assumed to be stationary with steady-state dynamics. Often there is 
                                                 
15
 Robustness can be defined as ‘the degree to which a system or component can function correctly in the 
presence of invalid inputs or stressful environment conditions’. Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (1990). 
16
 Technical system integrity describes a situation in which the technical performance of the system meets 
expectations. 
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only one parameter for the desired output, and one parameter for controlling the system, i.e. 
‘single input single output’ (SISO) systems. Even under these conditions, control system 
modelling is a very challenging task.17  
 
Of course other, more long-term oriented factors matter that partially condition 
technical reliability and long term security of supply, e.g., adequate investments or 
appropriate maintenance of the system. In our analysis we deal with control issues varying 
from very short term to long term. In this context, the representation provided by the 
analysis of closed control systems is particularly helpful in identifying critical technical 
functions of infrastructures.  
 
II.3: Critical control in infrastructures 
If we match our definition of criticality with the characteristics that closed control 
systems point to, control mechanisms can be labelled as critical if:  
(1) They imply a sufficient technical scope of control and they are unique in the 
sense that there are no alternative control mechanisms that perform similar 
tasks. Hence, they are crucial for the reliable technical functioning of the 
infrastructure system. A failure will have system wide consequences. 
(2) They involve strong time constraints, since critical control mechanisms need to 
be activated in a specific and often very short period of time. 
 
An important dimension that interferes with critical technical control mechanisms in 
infrastructures has to do with capacity management of network related resources. Indeed, 
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 ‘Multiple input multiple output’ (MIMO) systems of control are sometimes estimated by a linear 
combination of several SISO models.  Dutton, Thompson and Barraclough (1997), p.20 
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network capacities are usually limited and need to be allocated for different users in 
different periods of time for various objectives.  In the railway sector the time slots need to 
be allocated in a way that allows organizing a timetable which meets travellers’ 
expectations for timely and fast relocation between the various nodes in the network. In the 
drinking water sector the pressure in the pipeline systems needs to be stabilized within the 
constraints imposed by the physical capacities of the network in order to meet the needs of 
the consumers with continuity.   
 
There is a discussion in control engineering about whether it is possible to avoid 
short term control problems by a more intelligent design of the technical system. Short term 
control problems might be mitigated by a thorough long term planning. However, there are 
limits to this approach. Complex technical systems typically evolve over time and control 
problems arise as the system is evolving, without an integrated technical planning.18 For 
instance, the electricity system evolved from a local system, to regional, national and 
supranational – an evolutionary development without any overall blueprint.  In water 
systems, the changing demography of cities as well as changes in architectural design 
makes long term technical planning also difficult and requires adaptability in control 
mechanisms at a level which is hard to anticipate. 
 
III. CRITICAL TRANSACTIONS 
The technical criticality of some functions in the adequate provision of 
infrastructures and the conditions they impose on control mechanisms have an impact on 
how transactions should be organized among different nodes of the system and on the 
resulting costs. In this section, we focus on this transactional issue, i.e., on transactions that 
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 Dutton, Thompson and Barraclough (1997), p.2 
 16
are critical in the provision of supports for control mechanisms in infrastructures. 
Transactions are about the transfer of ‘rights to use’ goods or services across 
technologically separable interfaces (Williamson, 1985, Prologue, p. 1; Ménard, 2005 p. 
284). Two aspects are particularly significant in the concept of transaction thus defined.  (1) 
The very existence of transactions requires that activities can be separable from a 
technological point of view. If technically this is not possible, there is no choice in terms of 
organization. However, if separability is feasible, the issue of how to organize transactions 
emerges: alternative solutions must be considered. (2) Separability from an economic 
viewpoint introduces the possibility of defining ‘rights’ on assets needed and of transferring 
these rights. There are different ways to do so, which introduces the problem of alternative 
(and competing) modes of organization.19  For example, different railroad companies can 
use the same rail track system, so that rights of access, which are typically rights to use, 
must be defined and allocated. Selling train tickets can be integrated as one activity among 
others in a railroad company, or can be outsourced to an independent company, which 
raises the issue of the organizational arrangement. 
 
 Hence, not all transactions have the same status, in that not all transactions are 
related to critical control mechanisms. For instance, trains with rights of access must be 
monitored by a traffic control centre in order to guarantee safety, while they can very well 
run without an entity selling tickets (e.g., public authorities can decide that using public 
transportation is free). We call ‘critical transactions’ those transactions essential to 
accommodate critical control mechanisms. A failure in ‘critical transactions’ threaten the 
capacity of the system to maintain one of the critical control mechanisms defined in the 
                                                 
19
 There is another consequence that we do not discuss here: since rights need to be defined and enforced, 
adequate institutional supports are essential for the system to function. 
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previous section. This means that critical transactions require an adequate mode of 
governance to coordinate critical technical functions. In that respect, they determine the 
alignment (or misalignment) of the technical dimension of control mechanisms, which in 
turn determines their criticality, with their governance dimension, which corresponds to 
allocations of rights that shape alternative modes of organization. This interrelation 
between critical technical functions and critical transactions is not addressed in the standard 
contract theory.20 
 
In order to capture analytically this interaction, we distinguish two dimensions that 
shape critical transactions, combining with varying importance: a technical-control 
dimension, which relates to the scope of control and the speed of adjustment of technical 
functions;21 and an organization-specific dimension, which concerns the organizational 
needs to meet the technical system requirements.   
 
III.1: Technical-control dimension  
 
Critical transactions are essential for guaranteeing the technical functioning of the 
system, thus imposing constraints on the mode of organization. Let us take the example of 
interconnection of different networks. Water could not be delivered to households without 
adequate control of the pressure in the interconnected pipe system. Trains could not 
interconnect if the rail system differs in width or in the type of energy required. Electricity 
networks could not function as an interconnected system without load balancing between 
production and demand of electric power. In other terms, critical technical functions impose 
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 See Salanié (2005)  
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 See our sub-section IV.1 for a definition and discussion of these characteristics. 
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certain characteristics to the organization of relevant transactions, usually pushing towards 
integration or towards tight control through a ‘strategic centre’. If there are competing 
producers of electricity, their access to the grid must be coordinated through a complex set 
of transactions for which the different possible arrangements are limited and all require 
unified decision rights at some nodes. These ‘critical transactions’ are associated to the 
monitoring and control of interfaces in the system, such as turning on and off key facilities, 
monitoring bottlenecks, and so forth. 
 
The coordination requirements depend on the characteristics of the critical technical 
functions, i.e. the scope of control and the speed of adjustment. On a very general level it 
can be stated that the coordination requirements become more stringent the larger the 
technical scope of control and the shorter the time period to react on disturbances. The case 
of load balancing in electricity systems illustrates: it has to be performed within micro-
seconds on a system wide technical scope of control. Usually this requires a system 
operator with short term directive decision rights in order to restore the balance of the 
system. Another extreme is the case of coordination requirements with respect to 
components of infrastructures for which a long period of time is needed for its realization. 
Refer for instance to the development of tracks for innovative high speed train or the 
construction of new international gas pipelines. These rail tracks or pipelines must fit into 
the existing network and they usually require years for their technical specificities to be 
designed and implemented. Under these conditions, the need for coordination can be 
accomplished through different modes of governance, including the implementation of 
standardization, different types of contracting, or even market competition for the best 
suitable technical solution.  
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III.2: Organization-specific dimension 
 Beside the effects on transactions due to technical factors of criticality, there are 
indeed critical effects related to the way the economic viability of the system is organized. 
For example, if a contract does not determine prices guaranteeing adequate return on 
capital, underinvestment follows, eventually to the point the system collapses. In other 
terms, there are organization-specific effects which play as essential a role as those 
identified in the technical-control dimension and must be dealt with in order to assure 
performance that allow the system to work.    
 
First, highly specific investments that infrastructures require must be made on 
critical assets of the system, e.g. power plants in electricity or pumping stations in water. 
We have learned from transaction costs economics that these investments will be made 
only if transactions are organized in a way that provides safeguards against risks of 
opportunism, usually under the form of integration or long term contracts.22 Second, some 
transactions may face circumstances generating significant uncertainty. The probability of 
snowstorms affecting the railroad system or transmission lines of electricity in Canada 
imposes not only technical constraints, but also organizational ones, e.g., capacities to 
restore the technical functioning of the system within reasonable delays. Choices by 
decision-makers, whether they are public or private, may also generate different levels of 
uncertainty: a nuclear plant imposes security measures, and therefore organizational 
arrangements, radically different from plants using gas propelled turbines. Third, the 
identification of critical transactions must take into consideration strategic behaviors: some 
parties may have an interest in defending that a transaction is technically critical because 
this preserves their monopolistic position. Last, but not least, because of their criticality, the 
                                                 
22
 See Shelanski and Klein (1995) and Klein (2005) for surveys on this issue. 
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key technical functions of control mechanisms require room for particularly powerful 
incentives, so as to attract and motivate adequately the highly specific human capabilities 
required. In that respect, contracts with engineers in charge of the safety in a nuclear plant 
will have different characteristics than those with engineers working in a coal plant. 
 
 To sum up, both technical-control and organization-specific dimensions of critical 
transactions should align with critical technical functions, pushing either towards 
integration, so that a unified organization secures the requirements of criticality, or towards 
hybrid arrangements, with a strategic center coordinating parties that are simultaneously 
complementing each other and competing. As a result, complex modes of organization 
emerge. 
 
IV. MODES OF ORGANIZATION TO SUPPORT CRITICAL TRANSACTIONS 
In this section we develop different categories of critical transactions by further 
operationalizing its technical-control dimensions and organization-specific dimensions. 
This allows us identifying modes of organization that support critical transactions, and thus 
help to align some technological requirements of infrastructures with appropriate modes of 
organization. 
 
IV.1: Categories of critical transactions 
As mentioned earlier, the technical-control dimension relates to the scope of control 
and the speed of adjustment. ‘Scope of control’ can be roughly decomposed in at least three 
different levels. The most extensive scope entails the ‘system’ level, which can be 
delineated by the most far reaching technical complementarities between its elements, i.e. 
the nodes and links of the network. In the case of railroad systems, this would entail the 
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interconnected and complementary activities including traffic control, slots allocation, 
timetabling, norms and standards with respect to compatibility of equipment, and so forth.  
A second level could be described as ‘subsystem’, which constitutes a technically separable 
part of the overall system. Subsystems are able to perform certain services independently 
from the overall system, but they are interconnected with it through a technical gateway (or 
backbone) in order to contribute to system wide services. For instance the railroad system 
can be divided into long distance and regional services. Regional systems are able to 
provide regional transport services independently and autonomously. However, for long 
distance travelling, interconnections to long distance railway tracks and corresponding 
regional networks are necessary. In this example we can identify the interconnected railway 
system as the relevant ‘system’ level of analysis, whereas the regional networks constitute 
the ‘subsystems’. Finally, at the lowest level of abstraction the various ‘components’ of 
infrastructures can be identified. In the case of railway systems this would include 
components like locomotives with adequate propulsion, marshalling yards, and railway 
stations.   
 
‘Speed of adjustment’ is interpreted as the time span that is available to perform the 
feedback loop in closed control systems as indicated in figure 123. This might be measured 
in time periods ranging from fractions of a second to decennia. Since the exact 
measurement of time periods is quite specific for each infrastructure sector, we propose to 
define this time dimension in terms of different degrees of freedom with respect to the 
completion of the feedback loop (Figure 1). Although time is continuous, for analytical 
purposes we take four discrete points that have sufficiently distinct characteristics in terms 
of the operation and planning of the control system: 
                                                 
23
 Joskow (2003) stresses the importance of this point with respect to the electricity sector. 
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- T0: Operational balancing of the control system, under the condition that all 
technical and organizational parameters of the system are given, except for the 
external disturbances. These are typically very short term operations, like load 
balancing of the electricity system, or traffic control in railways or aviation.  
- T5: Capacity utilization under the same assumptions as in T0, but in addition the 
operation of the technical process can be altered or modified.  For instance, 
electricity producers can make a choice whether to produce power or not, 
depending on the price in the spot market. These decisions are typically made 
within a few hours or days. The existing capacity can be adapted to the specific 
technical and economic conditions of the system and its users.  
- T15: Capacity allocation under the same assumptions as in T5, but in addition the 
resources that are needed to facilitate the technical process can be allocated. 
Examples are the allocation of slots for passenger- and cargo transport in 
railway systems, the allocation of cross border transmission capacity in energy, 
or slot allocation on airports in aviation. In other words, the capacity can be 
modified in response to changing needs of users and producers.  
- T50: System innovation and/ or transformation under the same assumptions as in 
T15, but in addition the reference values with respect to the expected technical 
performance of the system are changing. This requires the design of a new 
control loop, in which all elements, including the technical process, are 
redesigned. Typically this is a long term process that takes several decades to be 
effectuated. Examples include system expansion or system modernization, like 
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for instance the construction of new international gas pipelines, new high speed 
rail connections, or the development of intelligent networks in electricity.24  
 
The operationalization of the technical-control into three values depicting the scope of 
control and four values describing the speed of adjustment allows combining them into a 
matrix with twelve different combinations representing different categories of critical 
transactions (Figure 2).  As we demonstrate in the following section, each category 
represents different organization-specific dimensions as well. Hence, each of these 
categories imposes different constraints on modes of organization to secure the reliable 
technical functioning of the infrastructure system.25  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Modes of organization to secure critical transactions 
(Organizational requirements in parenthesis) 
 
                                                 
24
 Initiative to develop intelligent electricity networks include www.smartgrids.eu (2007) and 
www.gridwise.org (2007)  
25
 In our approach we take the technical-control dimension as the starting point for the identification of critical 
transactions. This is in line with the objective of our analysis of identifying those transactions that are critical 
to support the technical functioning of infrastructures. However, other categories of critical transactions might 
be identified if we would take another starting point of the analysis, like for instance the organization-specific 
dimension. 
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IV.2: Modes of organization to secure critical transactions. 
We first discuss modes of organization related to the scope of control (i.e. the 
columns of Figure 2), followed by the speed of adjustment (i.e. rows of Figure 2). At the 
system level, critical transactions require directive interventions in order to guarantee the 
technical complementarities that are essential to safeguard the reliability of the 
infrastructure system. Load balancing in electric power systems or traffic control in 
aviation and rail transport illustrate what is at stake here. At this level, investments are 
typically very specific since the associated technical control mechanisms are unique and 
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represent dedicated assets in the system. Examples include control centres for power 
systems or traffic flows, which are typically dedicated for their use in specific infrastructure 
systems. Uncertainty is another important aspect, deriving from the facts that these 
investments have a very long lifetime and that the technical and economic conditions of the 
system are difficult to predict. In addition, the extensive scope of control required and its 
accompanying interdependence create opportunities for strategic behaviour for those who 
operate and control these facilities. In order to safeguard these critical transactions, strong 
incentives are needed to attract the necessary resources and knowledge. These organization-
specific dimensions pinpoint to modes of organization that centralize decision rights, 
especially in order to meet the tight time restrictions and to secure the expected system 
performance.   
 
At the level of subsystems, the degree of technical complementarity is limited to this 
more or less isolated level; hence assets tend to be less unique. Regional railway networks 
or local electricity distribution grids provide examples. However, in order to allow the 
subsystems to technically connect to each other, a certain degree of coordination is 
required. Asset specificity is still an important issue, but since several subsystems with 
comparable characteristics might coexist, there tend to be opportunities to redeploy 
investments. Basically, the possible consequences of a technical failure of critical functions 
are limited to the reliability of the subsystem. Accordingly, from a system perspective the 
degree of uncertainty potentially decreases as well as the opportunities for opportunistic 
behaviour. This provides some relieve for the incentives that are needed to safeguard 
critical functions.  
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For the components of infrastructures, compliance with the system needs has to be 
safeguarded. Components need to fulfil technical requirements in order to contribute to the 
technical complementarity of the system. For example, opening competition to providers of 
rail freight services require that they use homologated equipment, fitting in the existing 
capacities. The degree of asset specificity is comparably low, as well as the degree of 
uncertainty and the possibility for opportunistic behaviour. 26 Modes of organization need 
to facilitate corroboration27 in order to establish and sustain system complementarities.  
 
Turning to the speed of adjustment, the following requirements with respects to the 
modes of organization arise.  T0 stands for the operational balancing of infrastructures. In a 
very short period of time, the system needs to be technically adjusted to unexpected 
external disturbances. For instance, if there is a train accident, the traffic needs to be 
rerouted and actions need to be taken to repair the damage as soon as possible. This 
requires tight supervision in order to force the necessary changes of the technical state of 
the system. Specific investments are required in order to reduce uncertainty and prevent 
strategic behaviour, since a failure of the operational balancing will have direct 
consequences for the reliability of infrastructure systems.  
 
At T5 capacity utilization requires monitoring of the operation of the technical 
process. Resources need to be dedicated for the production process in order to produce the 
desired infrastructure services. Since this allows for some relocation between different 
production means, the degree of asset specificity is declining, along with the degree of 
                                                 
26
 Still asset specificity can be an issue at this level of analysis. Components like electricity plants represent 
long term investments of several decades.  
27
 Corroboration is here understood as a process of securing and/ or strengthening complementarities between 
the components of the system.  
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uncertainty and opportunities for strategic behaviour. For example there may be backup 
capacity in electric power plants that can meet peaks of demand in exceptionally cold or 
exceptionally warm weather. 
 
T15 denotes a point in time in which capacity allocation is possible. This long term 
process needs to be facilitated in order to make sure that critical transactions are supported 
to sustain the technical system complementarities. Since there is a long time period 
involved to perform the feedback loop between the expected and actual system 
performance, there is opportunity to deploy technological and organizational variety. 
Referring to the electricity sector example, new power plants can be built, or the networks 
extended or reinforced. However, in order to support system complementarities, this 
process needs to be facilitated in order to make sure that the desired outcomes are realized. 
Building new power plants might make it necessary to adjust network capacity. At this 
point, there is limited asset specificity involved. However, there is significant uncertainty 
with respect to the future technical and economic states of the system, which opens the door 
to strategic behaviour. Examples of sources of uncertainty are the future demand for 
energy, or future preference with respect to primary energy sources, like fossil fuel or 
sustainable sources like wind or solar.  
 
T50 is concerned with system transformation and/ or innovation. This is associated 
with planning in order to meet technical and organizational needs of the system. New water 
facilities, such as building a new dam or creating new reservoirs, or building new gas 
pipelines that cross different countries are illustrative. This is the most long term process 
with respect to the establishment, operation, and management of control systems. Asset 
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specificity is submitted to major trade-offs, since many alternative investments, possibly by 
different and even competing operators can be considered, whereas uncertainty is high.  
 
Combining these different values of the technical-control dimension leads to twelve 
possible modes of organisation that are indicated by the cells of Figure 2.  These modes of 
organization imply a certain structure or ‘logic’, which is visualized by different degrees of 
shading, basically from the most centralized forms of coordination to decentralized and 
possibly competing ones.28 The upper left (dark shaded) cell indicates the case of 
‘authoritative supervision’, typically through hierarchical integration or similar 
arrangements. Since system wide critical transactions are involved and technical balancing 
needs to be assured on the spot, only a centralistic and prescriptive approach of 
organization can meet these requirements. Information systems and backup equipments for 
coordinating airlines are an absolute requisite to guarantee effectiveness and safety of air 
traffic. This can be understood as the most critical transaction. The other extreme is the 
bottom right cell of ‘decentralized planning’ of system innovations at the level of 
components, e.g., developing new models of locomotives. This very long term process 
allows for very different modes of governance as long as the result of this decentralized 
planning process meets the needs of infrastructure systems. In the most far reaching case 
this could be left to autonomous market processes, in which the ‘invisible hand’ would act 
as a selection process for the innovations to be performed. In between (lightly shaded cells) 
we have different forms of hybrid modes of organization, as with mutual monitoring, in 
which autonomous parties have to share some decision rights, and eventually, ownership 
                                                 
28
 There are other important aspects that influence the alignment between technical functions and modes of 
organization that are not considered here, e.g., the role of market structures, the impact of public policies and 
regulation, or the effects of radical innovations.  
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over some specific assets that require coordination. Allocating tradable rights of access to 
networks illustrate this point. 
 
V. DIFFERENCES ACCROSS INFRASTRUCTURES AND OVER TIME 
Having elaborated the concept of critical transactions and related it to different 
modes of organization, we now briefly indicate two important issues that could help 
analysing the relation and tensions between technological requirements and modes of 
organization, particularly in a context of reform of infrastructures. First technology in 
different infrastructure sectors imposes different technical control systems in order to 
support different degrees of technical complementarities. Second, technological innovation 
may have a deep impact on the way transactions can be effectively organized.  
 
V.1 Differences across infrastructures 
Different technological needs translate into specific critical transactions, and hence 
different modes of organization that are available for a possible restructuring of distinct 
sectors.  
 
Referring to the technical-control dimension, infrastructures differ with respect to 
scope of control and speed of adjustment. The prevalent technology of the electricity sector 
constitutes an extreme case of operational balancing of the entire system. The inflow and 
outflow of power needs to be technically balanced within very short periods of time in 
order to safeguard the reliance of the system. Under the given technological conditions, 
there is no opportunity for time shifting of the consumption and/ or production of 
electricity, since there are no large-scale means of storage or demand side management. 
This creates very complex technological and organizational needs in order to support the 
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technical functioning of the system. The railway sector, in contrast, is less stringent with 
respect to the need for operational balancing, since there are technical opportunities to shift 
the operations of trains in time by allowing for certain delays. This diminishes the 
reliability of the service, but this does not threaten the technical dependability and safety. 
The technical consequences of a delay of a train service are far less serious as compared to 
a blackout in an electricity system. Indeed, passenger transport services can be shifted in 
time, electricity consumption usually not.  On the other hand, the slot allocation of tracks 
and railway stations is far more restrictive compared to the transport and distribution of 
electricity. Electricity is a homogenous commodity that is transported throughout the 
network according to physical laws without a predetermined and dedicated pathway to be 
followed. Obviously, this is a very different case for the personal transport services of 
railways. Certain tracks and stations need to be allocated at specific programmed dates and 
times. As a consequence, in this sector timetabling is a very critical transaction imposing 
restrictions with respect to the modes of organization of capacity utilization and allocation.  
 
There are also infrastructures in which there are only limited inherent critical 
transactions. Radio frequencies constitute an interesting case particularly with respect to 
scope of control. Operational balancing is necessary to prevent technical interference 
between the frequencies. In order to solve this problem, radio frequencies are exclusively 
allocated for different purposes like emergency services, army, aviation, shipping, 
broadcasting, wireless telephony, wifi, etc.  Dedicated users receive a right to use the 
frequencies at certain times and locations. In other words, subsystems are created that 
function independently from each other on an exclusive basis. It is up to the users to utilize 
and allocate services according to the technical opportunities. In order to protect the 
technical integrity of the entire system of radio frequencies, certain norms and standards are 
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defined with respect to the various components that constitute this infrastructure. Under 
these circumstances operational balancing is mainly based on general framework 
conditions. The most sensitive issue for the use of frequencies is capacity allocation. 
Liberalizing this sector would involve a discussion on alternative modes of capacity 
allocation, for instance guided- or competitive allocation mechanisms. However, a change 
of the mode of organization of a specific critical transaction can have implications for the 
mode of organization of other critical transactions. Changing for instance the allocation 
mechanism of radio frequencies towards competition, might involve a necessity to 
strengthen supervisory authorities that monitor the operational balancing of the use of 
frequencies.  
 
To sum up, our classification of modes of organization of critical transactions 
suggest that (1) different infrastructures imply different critical transactions; (2) different 
opportunities for sector restructuring depend on feasible modes of organization of critical 
transactions; and (3), in order to guarantee reliable system services, modes of organization 
in a specific infrastructure need to satisfy its critical technical functions.  Any reform that 
intends to be effective without threatening the efficiency of the system must incorporate 
these criteria. 
 
V.2. A dynamic perspective  
So far we have considered the technology of infrastructures as given. However, 
technology changes with implications for the critical transactions thus requiring adaptation 
or even radical changes in modes of organization, which in turn imposes built-in flexibility 
in order to make a reform durable. For instance, information and communication 
technology increasingly offers opportunities to monitor and control network related 
 32
activities, thus lowering transaction costs and making viable market arrangements that 
previously involved prohibitive costs. In the electricity sector for instance, the critical 
transaction of operational load balancing might be shifted from the system level (i.e. high 
voltage network) to the subsystem (i.e. low voltage distribution network). From a technical 
perspective this would imply the introduction of so called intelligent distribution networks 
(“smart grids”). Nowadays distribution networks have no other technical function than 
transforming the voltage level (for instance from 380 KV to 220 V) and transporting 
electric power to the final customers. Future intelligent electricity distribution networks 
would perform important system tasks like facilitating the production of electricity in small 
scale distributed plants, and technically balancing the inflow and outflow of power. This 
would result in an electricity web, similar to the internet, with partly technical independent 
subsystems that are connected through a backbone in order to allow power exchanges 
between the different subsystems. If this system innovation is to be realized, this would 
have significant implications for the modes of organization of critical transactions, since 
new opportunities for restructuring arise, e.g. more decentralized and less tightly 
coordinated. 
 
Another remarkable example is road pricing based on electronic portals and 
automatic debiting systems. With these new technologies, physical access control and 
payment is not anymore necessary. This results in a more efficient system of monitoring 
and control with less transaction costs, but it also involves tighter coordination with respect 
to information flows and controlled access.   
 
These examples illustrate that technological change has fundamental repercussions 
for the nature of critical transactions and accordingly the possible modes of organization. 
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Restructuring infrastructures without considering the nature of its critical transactions and 
the according modes of organization can be doomed to result in major flaws with respect to 
the technical reliability of services.   
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we addressed the interrelation between technology and institutions in 
infrastructures, with a view at sector reform-oriented policies.  Often these institutional 
reforms neglect the technical dimension of infrastructures as well as the organizational 
requirements as possible barriers or drivers for change. This can result in inferior technical 
performance, in some cases even resulting in major accidents like blackouts in the 
electricity sector, accidents in rail transport or substantial leakages in water systems. Since 
infrastructures are characterized by strong technical complementarities, there is a need to 
sustain and harmonize technical processes that are physically interlinked through networks. 
Our analysis suggests that what is crucial is the capacity to align reforms in modes of 
organizations with critical transactions in order to preserve a coherent framework in which 
critical technical control functions are related to a specific set of modes of organization so 
as to guarantee reliable system services.  
 
Our analysis of critical transactions also points out that different infrastructures 
imply different critical transactions. Hence, depending on the possible modes of 
organization of critical transactions, there are different opportunities for sector 
restructuring. We even went a step further: not only are there important differences across 
sectors, but there can also be significant differences in criticality among different 
components of a specific sector, as illustrated by our figure 2, so that modes of organization 
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need to be conceived as modules that must be properly aligned with each other according to 
the characteristics of the transactions at stake.  
 
The successful restructuring of infrastructures strongly depends on the capacity to 
align technical functions and the modes of organization by properly identifying critical 
transactions. Reformers must also keep an eye on how technological innovation can interact 
with existing arrangements. Therefore, our analysis has strong implications for policy 
makers: critical technical functions need to be clearly identified; critical transactions should 
be differentiated from transactions that do not threaten the coherence of a system; and the 
modular aspect of organizations dealing with complex nodes of transactions should all be 
taken into account.  Restructuring infrastructures without keeping simultaneously a grip on 
these dimensions is doomed to result in major failures with respect to the technical 
reliability of services. Policies oriented towards successful reforms of key infrastructures 
should urgently be revised in order to integrate these dimensions. 
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